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ABSTRACT
The article revisits the issue of the political functionality and social organization in Caucasian de facto 
entities. Basing on theoretical approaches regarding the phenomenon of unrecognized states, the paper 
examines cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) with the focus on 
internal and external factors, including historical legacy, system of power, weakness of the mother state as 
well as support of the metropolitan state. It concludes that de facto entities demonstrate the vitality of their 
societies and political maturity, but their future depends mostly on international politics.
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In the scientific literature, the issue of unrecognized post-Soviet states (Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Transnistria) is generally present-
ed in the context of international politics and geopolitical rivalry in the region [Pegg 
1998; Lynch 2002; Iwańczuk & Kapuśniak 2008; Caspersen 2011]. In this approach, 
researchers are not focused on the problem of state-building, the development of the 
political systems or the domestic policy of post-Soviet de facto entities [Broers 2005; 
Мarkedonov 2008]. However, two decades of their efficient functioning makes it 
possible to generalize and describe the main features of their political development. 
Since 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been partially recognized states. They 
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are recognized by only a few members of the United Nations, including Nicaragua 
and Nauru, which makes this recognition disputable. Nevertheless, formal recogni-
tion and the considerable political support of the Russian Federation are important 
achievements for both republics. Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria belong to the 
category of de facto states: they possess suspended sovereignty and have successfully 
launched the process of state-building but are not recognized by any UN member. 
In some negotiations they are considered as independent parties to the conflicts 
[Markedonov 2012b: 20–25]. 
This paper is devoted to the political systems of Caucasian de facto entities, that 
despite individual specificity present many common features, such as regularities 
in the development of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh after the 
announcement of independence in the early 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, de facto and fully recognized post-Soviet states faced the same problems of 
political transformation. The main difference and determinant of the development of 
de facto entities was a lack of full recognition. As will be proved in this paper, that 
fact was not an obstacle in the formation of relatively stable and effective political 
systems. According to Pal Kolstø’s theoretical research that since de facto entities 
are not supported by international recognition, they must be sustained by internal 
factors [Kolstø 2006: 723–740], the following paper examines various aspects of 
the political systems of Caucasian de facto entities: external conditions (the impact 
of the international environment on the de facto states), infernal conditions (e.g., the 
social background of the political systems) and main features of political systems 
(the systems of power). 
INTERNATIONAL FACTOR: WEAKNESS OF MOTHER STATE
Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh separatism exploited when 
the Soviet Union was liberalizing its political life. Thus, they enjoyed the same con-
ditions of perestroika as Georgian and Azerbaijani separatism. Post-Soviet national 
movements developed according to a similar scenario, thereby the starting point for 
establishing independent states in Georgia or Abkhazia in 1990–1991 was almost the 
same. One can notice that contemporary Caucasian states and unrecognized entities 
developed separately. Since the beginning of their existence, de facto states have not 
had any legal ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan.
All military attempts made by Tbilisi and Baku to ensure the integrity of the state 
have failed. Defeats in wars were evidence of ineffectiveness of the policy towards 
disputed territories. Although within Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s budgets, expenses on 
military affairs are much bigger than the budgets of de facto states, the next potential 
confrontation would not be successful for Tbilisi or Baku. Unrecognized states are 
recompensing their infrastructural and financial shortcomings with determination 
and support from metropolises. The lack of effective international support for long-
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term conflict settlement, as well as the lack of influential patrons contribute to the 
weakness of both Georgia and Azerbaijan.
For citizens and elites of the de facto entities, Georgia and Azerbaijan are not 
interesting alternatives to statehood. Noticeable nationalist moods exist in both repub-
lics, which make it hard to imagine the peaceful coexistence of antagonized nations. 
Georgian and Azerbaijani authorities have done nothing to increase the attraction of 
their countries to the secessionist territories. There is no non-ethnic understanding of 
nation and the dividing line of ‘us’ and ‘them’ remains strong [Splidsboel 2009: 5].
In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were heavily destroyed during 
wars, the potential of Georgian economy could play a big role. Although Georgia has 
enjoyed market growth since 2003, widespread poverty (affecting 28% of society), 
a high level of unemployment and the collapse of agriculture are still big problems 
[Lynch 2004: 165]. Georgia cannot offer Abkhazians and Ossetians a social service 
competitive to Russia’s, which for many families is the main source of income. In the 
case of the NKR, the factor that alienates Armenians from Azerbaijan is not econo-
my (Azerbaijan is the leader of the region in this matter), but an extremely difficult 
historical background as well as cultural and confessional differences. 
In a certain way the unattractiveness of the mother states is caused by the char-
acter of their political regimes. The level of civil liberties and political rights in 
Abkhazia and the NKR is higher than in Azerbaijan, which is stagnating in author-
itarianism. Thus, due to the problems with establishing democratic institutions and 
procedures, Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s political systems are not attractive for the 
societies of unrecognized states.
INTERNATIONAL FACTOR: METROPOLITAN STATES SUPPORT
Caucasian de facto states enjoy support from metropolitan states and are heavily 
dependent on them. Russia’s involvement in the separatist conflict can be explained 
in the context of the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus region. There-
fore, Russia’s support and protection of Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be treated 
as a function of Kremlin’s global and regional policy. Russia would probably not 
be engaged in separatist movements if the Caucasus was not one of the regions of 
hottest global rivalry.
Russia’s military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia started at the beginning 
of the 1990s and was a result of the international society’s decision not to send joint 
peace forces to these areas. In consequence, Russia was the only country that took 
responsibility for maintaining the ceasefire. The exacerbation of Russia-Georgia 
relations since the beginning of the 21st century has been effected by Russia’s hidden 
policy of supporting separatism. Evidence of this was the support for Sukhumi and 
Tskhinvali during the 5-day war in 2008, but the support has roots in Kremlin’s will-
ingness to control the South Caucasus and fits The Strategy of the National Security 
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of the Russian Federation [Malashenko 2000: 34–47]. Multidimensional support for 
both unrecognized republics aims to ensure the security of Russia.
Russia maintains influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia using various tools: 
besides formal and informal political and military support, Moscow develops the de-
pendence of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s societies and elites with Russia’s help. Its 
institutional assistance (especially to South Ossetia) is a kind of ‘outsourcing’ [Popescu 
2006: 1]. This assistance covers internal matters and state security and consists of taking 
control in these issues by approved persons.1 Russian financial support aims to make 
the de facto states conditional, Russian business tries ‘to purchase’ their infrastructure, 
economies. Restorations of war damages are taking place on Russian loans that will 
be difficult to repay [Kazin 2009: 139]. This means that in the long-term perspective, 
Russia’s patronage will have negative consequences for the de facto states and could 
destabilize their political systems [Markedonov 2012a: 189–194].
The role of Armenia in the domestic polity of the NKR is quite different. In this 
case one can talk about specific mutual ties between Armenia and the NKR. Both 
states have created one space of Armenian ethnos and can be almost considered as 
one country [Minasyan 2011: 142–151]. Contemporary Armenia’s political elites, 
who arose during the Karabakh conflict, constructed Armenia’s political scene for 
many years. The purposeful lack of recognition of the NKR by Armenia does not 
reflect on the close cooperation and the absolute support for Stepanakert. Armenia’s 
authorities support the NKR diplomatically, militarily and economically. Armenia’s 
funds make up a big part of the NKR budget and donations by the Armenian diaspora 
play an important role in state income.
Russia’s involvement with the NKR is relatively weak. The ‘frozen conflict’ 
over Karabakh is in Russia’s favour since it allows Russia to keep influence in the 
region through an alliance with Armenia, a member of the Collective Treaty Organ-
ization and a future member of the Eurasian Customs Union. Accession to the latter 
organization would destroy the integrity of Armenia and the NKR and would push 
the NKR into full isolation. 
JUSTIFICATION OF SEPARATISM: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE RIGHT TO 
SELF-DETERMINATION
In order to justify separatist tendencies and striving for their own states, the nations 
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh use historical arguments. All three 
republics point to the tradition of national self-organization (especially Abkhazia), 
emphasizing the length of time of possession of disputed territories. History is used 
1 For instance, the Prime Minister of Abkhazia Nodar Khashba; the Minister of Defence of Abkha-
zia Sultan Sosnaliev, the Prime Ministers of South Ossetia Aslanbek Bulatsev and Vadim Brovtsev were 
related to Russia.
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as a tool that legitimizes contemporary secessionist tendencies, the existence of de 
facto states as well as Georgian and Azerbaijani claims to these territories. Historical 
statehoods are inseparably related to the national rhetoric that in the early 1990s was 
used by former communist elites, nomenklatura, as an expedient tool to preserve their 
privileged political status. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, former party leaders have 
maintained a predominant impact on the political development of the de facto states. 
Moreover, at the early stage of the struggle for independence, the political elites of 
both separatist entities demonstrated resistance against unpredicted consequences of 
changes in perestroika and disintegration tendencies. In fact, Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian elites sought Kremlin’s support against the new Georgian authorities headed 
by Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Formal loyalty to the Soviet central government was rather 
a trick; a tactical move aimed against Georgian attempts to leave the Soviet Union and 
eliminate autonomous regions within Georgia [Мarkedonov 2012b: 55–64].
After the dissolution of the USSR in late 1991, all three separatist entities justi-
fied secession from Georgia and Azerbaijan through international law and the right 
to self-determination. Using moral and legal arguments, unrecognized authorities 
claimed the secessions were the result of ethnic discrimination experienced under 
Georgian and Azerbaijani power. In all de facto states referendums were held that con-
firmed common support for separatism.2 The international community as well as the 
authorities of both republics which were threatened by separatism did not recognize 
the results of referendums and the right to self-determination, pointing to the right to 
territorial integrity. Thereby, Georgia and Azerbaijan, newly independent states that 
had emerged after the collapse of the USSR and had declared self-determination, 
refused this right to their own autonomous territories. The refusal of autonomy for 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was considered in 
Tbilisi and Baku as the solution to ethnic and territorial conflicts [Cornell 2001; de 
Waal 2003]. The legal collision that is impossible to overcome means that both de 
facto and fully recognized states can find arguments in their favour. To conclude, in 
the light of history and international law, de facto states find justification for their 
struggle for independence.
SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE, NARROW POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND 
HIGH LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Historical and ethnopolitical circumstances were the main reasons behind sep-
aratist activities in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the NKR. Based on the supremacy 
of the national idea, the nations of the three de facto states were convinced that 
2 South Ossetia and the NKR organized their own referendums in independence while Abkhazia 
(then the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), on the contrary to Georgia, took part in the referendum 
on a new union treaty, organized by Soviet central authorities. 
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separation from Georgia and Azerbaijan was necessary. In order to save their own 
ethnic identity, the societies of the unrecognized states were determined to pay huge 
costs for military campaigns, destroying economic ties [Мarkedonov 2005]. These 
activities have led to the petrifaction of unrecognized political entities that have all 
the attributes of a state and are recognized by their residents. Caucasian de facto states 
are not temporary rogue black spots that do not need a constitution, legitimation of 
power and foreign relations, but well organized formal social structures that strive 
for the fulfilment of social demands, including state sovereignty.
It is noticeable that Caucasian de facto states present high levels of self-determi-
nation (the lowest is in South Ossetia) [Czachor 2014b: 50–58]. Formally, all these 
entities are unitary states with a presidential system of government and legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of power. All three republics have adopted constitu-
tions that declared a ‘rule-of-law based state’, principles of democracy, human rights, 
tough (according to specificity of the Caucasus) social and political relations based 
on clan-corporation and patrimonialism [Kazin 2009: 134–138; Hale 2015: 199–205, 
212–220, 289–302]. In the case of Abkhazia, where there are still big communities 
of national minorities, the political system is a kind of ethnocracy. The evidence of 
this is that, according to the constitution, only a person with Abkhazian nationality 
can be elected as the president of this republic.
The complicated relations between the nations struggling for independence and 
the states that claim authority over their territory seriously affect the prospects of 
a dialogue and mutual trust. Considerable parts of de facto entities’ peoples are vic-
timized persons that “cannot forget or forgive” [Clogg 2008: 305–329]. Although it 
is hard to imagine at the level of interethnic relations, the consequences of eventual 
reunification of the de facto states with Georgia and Azerbaijan are ensuring that 
Abkhazian, South Ossetian and the NKR authorities continue efforts for international 
recognition and the idea of sovereignty has no alternative. There are no parties or 
politicians that are calling for the incorporation of de facto states into the mother 
states. Such an attitude would be treated as the harshest crime against these states.
In some sense for Abkhazians and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians the current 
political status quo is acceptable. The independence declared by their governments, 
although unrecognized by the international community, meets national aspirations 
and the close ties with the metropolitan states ensure a relatively high level of security 
and, at the same time, do not impede internal relations. In the case of South Ossetia, 
the authorities are formally applying for the union with North Ossetia within the 
Russian Federation but current close relations with North Ossetia and big support 
from the Russian budget satisfy the political elites in Tskhinvali. Hence, for the so-
cieties and politicians of de facto states there is no alternative to continuing efforts 
for international recognition and strengthening political systems.3
3 The only exception is South Ossetia, where there are no tendencies to develop a separate South 
Ossetian nation. 
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On the other hand, consolidation around the idea of independence is reflected in 
the political discourse in the de facto states. The absolutization of sovereignty in the 
condition of unsettled conflict and the uncertain status of the state distinctly limits 
political discourse and affects all political actors. For instance, in the parliamentary 
elections in the NKR in 2010, the programmes of the political parties were similar, 
and in 2012, Bako Sahakyan, who was striving for re-election, was also supported by 
the opposition. Similar situation was during elections in Abkhazia [O’Bojhin 2014: 
138–141]. Due to the attention paid to independence by all political parties, differences 
in their programmes are not big. In the elections, voters choose the politicians they 
know. A significant impact on the political culture of de facto states is made by the 
small number of inhabitants. It means inhabitants have a bigger social control over 
politicians and their responsibility to the voters.
Thus, the supremacy of the idea of independence is the main factor that consoli-
dates societies of unrecognized states and is the source of popular mobilization. Abkha-
zians, South Ossetians and NKR Armenians are aware that a weakening involvement 
in defence of political achievements might have serious consequences: the possible 
resumption of warfare with Georgia and Azerbaijan would carry a fatality threat for 
de facto states and the subsistence of their nations. Because of that, the political sys-
tems and whole socio-political life of the NKR, a large part of South Ossetia and part 
of Abkhazia is close to ‘military regime’. This means there is a strong, predominant 
position of the president in the political system and a centralization of power with 
a key role for military officers (siloviki) and former officers, who occupy the main 
positions in the state. Such a ‘military regime’ is accompanied by the acceptance of 
a well-organized society.
The big threat of losing their own states makes the nations of de facto entities more 
engaged in political life. Their appreciation of independence is reflected in participation 
in elections. The turnout in the last election was not lower than 71% (except in the 
Abkhazian parliamentary election in 2012). The idea of independence and the political 
practice of over the last 20 years is consolidating nations. A big positive impact on the 
political systems of the unrecognized republics is made by a low level of social cleavage.
Due to specificity of the Caucasian societies, class cleavage can be substituted 
by clan cleavage. In the case of de facto states it plays the biggest role in Abkhazia, 
where political life is shaped by rivalry between Gudauta and Ochamchira clans [Kazin 
2009: 136]. Despite some unrest, which is evidence of this cleavage, since 2004 up 
until the summer of 2014, the political status quo has not been breached. In the two 
other republics, the role of clan cleavage is smaller. In the case of South Ossetia, clan 
cleavage was considered to be between Eduard Kokoity’s clan and single smaller 
groups that were competing with him. In the NKR, this cleavage is essentially absent. 
Due to the historical background and strong local identity the whole society of the 
NKR may be treated as one clan.
Because of the relative ethnic homogeneity and marginalization of Georgians in 
the social life of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, confessional and ethnic cleavages play 
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a moderate role in these states. In the case of the NKR, where in the late 1980s to early 
1990s, more drastic changes in ethnic structure took place and all Azerbaijanis left the 
territory or died in fights, the NKR is currently ethnically, culturally and confessionally 
homogenous. Due to the small territory of de facto states, a predominantly agrarian 
economy and the lack of large urban areas, centre vs. periphery cleavage does not play 
an important role. In the Abkhazian and South Ossetian countryside, there are still single 
Georgian enclaves, but their capacity to destabilize the political systems is restrained. 
Comparing social cleavages in Georgia and Azerbaijan to those in de facto states, 
it seems to be evident that due to the bigger number of inhabitants and a larger eth-
nic and cultural diversity, they play a greater role in these fully recognized states. 
Generally, societies of de facto states are ethnically, culturally and confessionally 
homogenous and small. Thanks to that they are well-knit, invulnerable to external 
pressure and ready to defend their own interests [Czachor 2014a: 387–389].
It is important to note that strong executive power and a high level of popular 
mobilization for ‘military regimes’ does not interfere with the pluralism of political 
life. Despite all Caucasian de facto entities are witnessing authoritarian tendencies, 
there are often so many alternations of rulers and competitive elections that the result 
is hard to predict. In all unrecognized Caucasian republics, elections are accompanied 
by a struggle between political opponents. There have also been serious constitu-
tional crises that have been overcome by constructive methods, without breaching 
the political system.
DOMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS
The lack of international recognition is the main factor that makes the political 
systems of de facto entities different from the systems of other states in the Cauca-
sus region. Unsettled conflicts and ineffective peace processes coordinated by the 
international society are the main external threats to de facto states. As a result, the 
political systems are influenced by ‘military regime’. This situation is reflected in 
the system of power: the strong position of the president among other institutions, 
the centralization of power and also the high level of popular mobilization.
All Caucasian de facto entities have adopted systems of power with a predom-
inant position of the president. The strongest presidency has emerged in South 
Ossetia. When Eduard Kokoity was in power there was a strong tendency to extend 
his rights, giving him domination over the state. The Presidential Administration 
was particularly well developed. In this matter, South Ossetia’s authorities were 
following the example of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The office of the vice president 
makes the Abkhazian system of power similar to the Georgian one before 2004. In 
contemporary Abkhazia, the vice president, as well as the government, has very 
limited competences. The system of power in the NKR is similar to the Armenian 
one and is based on French semi-presidentialism [Czachor 2014a: 321].
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Due to typological difficulties in defining political regimes, their nature is deter-
mined by the power of the main political institutions: the president, the parliament and 
the government. In the scientific literature, there are various concepts of measuring 
the power of political institutions [Frye 1997: 523–549; Metcalf 2000: 660–685; Fish 
2006: 5–20; Antoszewski 2010: 43–44]. Using these methods one can notice that:
• the position in the system of power of the presidents of de facto entities and 
fully recognized Caucasian states is similar and dominant over other institu-
tions. They are the heads of states and exercise executive power;
• strong presidencies are accompanied by relatively weak parliaments and gov-
ernments;
• to provide policy, the presidents do not need the support of the parliamentary 
majority. The presidents’ legitimations of power are based on nationwide 
elections and the support of the citizens;
• parliaments of de facto states do not have developed control rights towards 
the presidents and the governments;
• the power of the parliaments is impaired by the presidents’ legislative rights 
and the right to veto acts produced by the parliaments;
• the governments have limited rights and fully depend on the presidents;
• in the light of that, ‘military regimes’ of de facto states are based not on the sys-
tem of institutions but on personal factors and the staffing of main state offices;
• the constitutions of each de facto entity recognize local self-government as 
an initial level of self-determination. In practice, local self-government effec-
tively works only in the NKR, while in South Ossetia it is only just becoming 
established.
The cases of post-Soviet political transformations suggest that a president 
equipped with broad competences is reflected in the limiting of democratization [Fish 
2006: 5–20]. What is worth pointing out is that strong presidential power in de facto 
entities does not disturb the development of political life. In all three unrecognized 
republics, one can observe elite turnovers and competitive elections that lead to the 
shifting of power. Rivalry and the political struggle for votes are typical for these 
republics. There have even been serious constitutional crises that were overcome by 
local societies in a better way than in many other post-Soviet states. 
TRANSITION FROM STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE TO  
THE CIVIL RULE OF LAW
After the period of forceful wars for independence and temporary ceasefires 
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia in June 1992, the NKR in May 1994) the unrecognized 
republics started the process of civil statebuilding [King 2001: 524–552]. They 
adopted democratic constitutions that guarantee human and civil rights and respect 
the principle of the separation of powers. Civil governments and political pluralism 
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are evidence of the common support of the nations for the idea of independence as 
well as the success of the institutionalization of the de facto states.
The constitution of Abkhazia was adopted by the parliament in November 1994 
(in 1990 Abkhazia restored the former Soviet constitution of 1925). The parliament 
elected Vladislav Ardzinba, the speaker of the Supreme Council and ‘founding 
father’ of contemporary Abkhazia, as president. Due to this, the clan that had been 
ruling since 1990 remained in power and got new legitimation under the new con-
stitution. The first nationwide election of the parliament was held in 1999 at the 
same time as a referendum on the constitution. The only candidate was incumbent 
President Ardzinba; he got almost 99% of the votes.
South Ossetia’s parliament adopted their constitution in November 1993, in-
troducing a parliamentary system. No new political institutions were created; the 
document aimed to settle the system of power after a long-term conflict between 
the head of the Parliament Torez Kulumbegov and the Prime Minister Oleg Teziev. 
Acceptable for all key political actors, the constitution was a tool that preserved 
the status quo. The next conflict was between the new speaker of the Parliament 
Lyudvig Chibirov and Prime Minister Vladislav Garabaev, and this accelerated 
work on a new constitution. It was worked out based on the Russian constitution 
and adopted in 1996. Chibirov was elected president and his power strengthened. 
In the NKR, in the period of the most dramatic fights with Azerbaijan in August 
1992, state power was taken by the State Defence Committee, headed by Robert Ko-
charian. After victorious military campaigns by Kocharian, the position of president 
was implemented into the political system of the republic. Kocharian was elected 
as President by the Parliament in December 1994. After that, Kocharian’s people 
proceeded to civil administration. In November 1996, in a nationwide election, Ko-
charian was re-elected. The appointment of the Prime Minister of Armenia in March 
1997 was evidence of the success of Kocharian’s government. The legal aspects 
of the process of statebuilding do not play a predominant role in strengthening the 
political system as is shown through the example of the NKR, which until the end 
of 2006 lacked a constitution [Kolstø, Blakkisrud 2008: 483].
When civilian governments were petrified in all de facto states, party systems 
and NGOs were formed. Meanwhile, in political life (especially in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia) one could notice two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, 
pluralism was developing well: there were independent media and legal parties that 
had their own representations in the parliament. On the other hand, authoritarian 
tendencies similar to those in other post-Soviet countries emerged: the president’s 
attempts to control political parties and media and election manipulation. In Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia, blatant attempts to keep power by the incumbent president’s 
clan after elections were lost, which led to serious constitutional crises. These were 
overcome by constructive methods, which one can interpret as evidence of the 
political maturity of elites and the strength of the civic society that was opposed 
to injustice.
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Shortly after the presidential elections in Abkhazia in 2004, supporters of Raul 
Khadjimba, who represented Ardzinba’s clan, tried to destabilize the situation caused 
by his unexpected defeat to opposing politician Sergei Bagapsh. The conflict was 
dissolved by a repeat vote, where Bagapsh and Khadjimba were joint candidates 
(Bagapsh for president, Khadjimba for vice president). Despite later conflicts, the 
peaceful solution of the conflict was a turning point in the process of building a dem-
ocratic society [Ó Beacháin 2012: 165–174].
In South Ossetia, the scenario of the crisis in 2011–2012 was similar to Abkhazia. 
The presidential candidate Anatoli Bibilov, who was supported by Kokoity’s clan, 
was defeated by independent Alla Dzhioyeva. Pressures against the opposition and 
attempts to manipulate the results of the election did not benefit Kokoity’s clan. In 
the repeat election Leonid Tibilov, who was supported by the opposition, won.
The mentioned conflicts were critical moments in the development of the political 
systems. Dissolutions of the crises opened the ways to internal reinforcement of po-
litical systems and stopped authoritarian tendencies. Unrecognized states witnessed 
precedents of shifting power towards the opposition, which is a rare phenomenon 
in the post-Soviet area. This situation is reflected in Freedom House rating that de-
clares political systems of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh as partly free and South 
Ossetia’s as not free [Freedom in the World 2014]. 
CONCLUSIONS
Examination of three case studies of Caucasian unrecognized states shows that 
the most sustainable political systems are in the NKR and Abkhazia. The Abkhaz are 
probably the most determined to establish a permanent independent state [Kolstø, 
Blakkisrud 2008: 483–490]. The NKR is seeking its future as a united state with 
Armenia, while South Ossetia is regularly applying for unification with North Ossetia 
within the Russian Federation.
The presidential system of power makes de facto states relatively strong and 
effective, but on the other hand, political parties are not institutionalized and political 
life is dominated by informal, neopatrimonial relations. This is typical for young 
democracies but in the long term perspective it could impede the success of democ-
ratization. All elections in unrecognized entities are hotly contested and their results 
are often unpredictable. A high level of popular mobilization and social cohesion are 
factors that will further consolidate the political systems.
With their long and relatively sustainable existence, de facto entities demonstrate 
the vitality of their societies and their political maturity. Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and the NKR meet almost all the criteria of a state (except for full recognition), and 
recognition only depends on the decisions of individual countries.
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